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THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHAPTER OF THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT AND INVESTMENT 
IN DEVELOPING NATIONS 
KRISTA L. COX* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has some of the highest standards of 
intellectual property protection in the world, though many 
copyright and patent laws in the United States are limited through 
balancing provisions that provide exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by the intellectual property system.  The United States 
also currently has robust industries that rely on intellectual 
property protection, such as the Pharmaceutical Research 
Association of America (PhRMA), the Motion Pictures Association 
of America (MPAA) or the Recording Industry Association of 
America RIAA), and their value is often increased through higher 
standards.  It is one of the few net-exporters of intellectual 
property and, as a result, receives greater benefits from heightened 
intellectual property standards than do countries that are net-
importers of these goods.  While the United States has its own 
balance between intellectual property rights and the public interest 
in its domestic laws, often it seeks only to export the rights for 
rightholders without the corresponding limitations and exceptions. 
The United States has engaged in efforts to raise intellectual 
property standards worldwide through the creation of new global 
norms such as through negotiations of the Trans-Pacific 
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Partnership Agreement (TPP).  One of the common arguments 
used in pushing for higher protections for intellectual property is 
that such standards will result in economic growth and 
development, either through burgeoning industries that rely on 
heightened intellectual property protection or through foreign 
direct investment.1  However, studies have shown that “rapid 
[economic] growth is more often associated with weaker IP 
protection.  In technologically advanced developing countries, 
there is some evidence that IP protection becomes important at a 
certain stage of development, but that stage is not until a country is 
well into the category of upper middle income developing 
countries.”2  According to another study, factors including “cost 
conditions, market size, levels of human capital and infrastructural 
development and broad macroeconomic conditions”, as well as 
deregulation, have been found to be more important to foreign 
direct investment than the levels of intellectual property 
protection.3  In fact, countries like Brazil, China and India have 
seen high influxes of foreign direct investment, even with low 
levels of intellectual property protection.4 
                                                     
1  See, e.g., Jay Taylor, Protecting IP to Foster Economic Growth in Malaysia, 
PHRMA (July 23, 2013), http://www.phrma.org/catalyst/malaysia-protecting-ip-
fosters-growth (“[S]trengthening intellectual property protections [results] in an 
influx of foreign direct investment and trade in high technology products, and . . . 
increased levels of research and development and innovation in developed and 
developing countries”); Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship 
Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 163, 165–66 (1998) (“[T]here is broad recognition that IPR systems play an 
important role in the promotion of technological progress.”).  But see Amy Jocelyn 
Glass & Kamal Saggi, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 56 J. 
INT’L ECON. 387 (2002) (finding that stronger IPR protection does not better protect 
individuals from imitation than Northern firms). 
2  Jean-Eric Aubert, Promoting Innovation in Developing Countries: A Conceptual 
Framework 26, (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3554, Apr. 2005). 
3  TRANSNAT’L CORPS. & MGMT. DIV. OF THE U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. DEV., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3 (1993). 
4  See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Foreign Direct Investment and the 
China Exception, in THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 153, 
153, 158 (Robert C. Bird & Subhash C. Jain eds., 2008) (noting that other factors 
also play a role in attracting foreign investment: “[i]n the case of China, foreign 
investors are usually not attracted by the strength of the country’s intellectual 
property protection.  Rather, they entered the Chinese market because of the 
drastically lower production costs, the country’s enormous market, its inefficient 
economic system and the preferential treatment of foreign investors” and “if 
stronger intellectual property protection always led to more FDI, ‘recent FDI 
flows to developing economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/3
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Higher levels of intellectual property protection may therefore 
be unnecessary to attract investment in developing countries.  
Accepting these higher standards may not only be unnecessary in 
promoting investment, but can also result in negative impacts on 
development.  Higher protections for copyrighted and patented 
goods raise the price of culture, education, and medicines that can 
detrimentally affect developing nations.5  Thus, developing 
countries carefully weigh the risks of accepting such higher 
standards, particularly where they are unnecessary in promoting 
investment and development. 
2. U.S. HISTORY:  RELIANCE ON FOREIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
DURING DEVELOPING YEARS 
The United States currently has very high standards of 
intellectual property protection, though historically this was not 
always the case.  When the United States was still developing, it 
did not provide protection to foreign intellectual property owners. 
Instead, the United States encouraged reliance on foreign 
works prior to the 1891 International Copyright Act.6  Recognition 
of foreign copyright in the United States, and increased intellectual 
property standards more generally, came not with the intention of 
attracting foreign direct investment, but rather because of external 
                                                     
and Eastern Europe . . . [rather than] China, Brazil, and other high-growth, large-
market developing economies with weak IPRs.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
5  See Knowledge Ecology International, Letter dated Mar. 22, 2011 from 
Knowledge Ecology International addressed to Anand Grover, Special 
Rapporteur for the U.N.: Complaint About the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement Negotiation (Mar. 22, 2011), available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/r2h_anand_grover_tpp_22march2011.p
df (discussing how the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiation will 
negatively impact public health); Krista L. Cox, The United States’ Demands for 
Intellectual Property Enforcement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and 
Impacts for Developing Countries 2 (Knowledge Ecology Int’l, Working Paper, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188029 
(“[P]roposed higher levels of enforcement of intellectual property rights would 
impact access to knowledge and access to medical technologies, among other 
issues.”). 
6  International Copyright Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891).  The 1790 
Copyright Act stated, “[N]othing in this act shall be construed . . . to prohibit the 
importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any 
map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a 
citizen of the United States, in foreign parts . . . .“ Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 
124 (1790).  
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and internal pressures.  Domestically, it was seen as in the interest 
of the United States to recognize foreign copyrights as local 
stakeholders lobbied for strong protections.  The University of 
California system and the University of Virginia, as well as Mark 
Twain, Louisa May Alcott and other prominent domestic authors, 
advocated for recognition of foreign copyright in order to ensure 
that their own copyrights would be recognized in foreign countries 
and that foreign works—which were often available at a fraction of 
the cost of domestic works—would not compete with their own 
works.7 
Similarly, the first patent act only provided protection to 
citizens of the United States and, later after amendments, those 
who had been residents for at least two years or those intending to 
become citizens.8  Not until 1836 did the United States remove the 
restrictions regarding nationality on patenting, though the 1836 
Act did charge nationals of other countries fees of ten to sixteen 
times higher than United States citizens and residents.9 
Although the United States, while it was in its own stages of 
developing, provided low standards of intellectual property 
protection and did not recognize foreign copyrights or patents, it 
now seeks to push these high standards on the rest of the world.  It 
has done so through a variety of mechanisms, perhaps most 
notably its annual “Special 301” lists—a unilateral process where 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) creates 
a “watch list” of countries that do not implement high standards of 
protection, even though they may fully comply with international 
obligations—and through the negotiations of free trade 
agreements.  Such efforts could be considered hypocritical and can 
slow the development of developing countries. 
3. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
Since 2010, the United States has been engaged in negotiations 
for a large regional trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific 
                                                     
7 See, e.g., Edward G. Hudon, Mark Twain and the Copyright Dilemma, 52 
A.B.A. J. 56, 56 (1966) (“[I]n this country foreign authors were left to the mercy of 
literary pirates, and American authors suffered the same fate abroad.”). 
8  Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); Act of April 17, 1800, 2 Stat. 37 (1800). 
9  Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, § 9 (1836). 
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Partnership Agreement (TPP).10  The number of parties since the 
inception of the negotiations has grown and now includes twelve 
countries:  Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United 
States.11  The negotiations have taken place behind closed doors 
and the public has not been granted access to the negotiating texts 
or positions of the parties.12 
Although none of the negotiating texts have officially been 
released, negotiating positions have come to light through various 
leaks.13  The United States’ proposals have reflected aggressive 
provisions reflecting high standards of intellectual property 
protection that generally provide new rights to rightholders, 
without adequate balancing provisions for the public interest.14  
                                                     
10 STATEMENT OF THE MINISTERS AND HEADS OF DELEGATION FOR THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Dec. 
13, 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/tpp. 
11  James Love, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L (Dec. 13, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://keionline.org/tpp. 
12  Id.  See also Complaint about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 5 
(discussing the lack of transparency in the Partnership); Mike Masnick, Members of 
Congress Demand USTR Open Up On TPP, TECHDIRT (Sept. 6, 2012, 8:18 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120906/02034520290/members-congress-
demand-ustr-open-up-tpp.shtml (“We've been talking about the incredible and 
ridiculous level of secrecy that the USTR has kept with regards to the TPP 
negotiations. . . .  [T]he public, and even key Congressional staffers are left out in 
the cold.”).   
13  The first of the three most notable leaks occurred in March 2011, when the 
United States’ comprehensive proposal for intellectual property (tabled in the 
February 2011 round in Santiago, Chile) was leaked.  Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Intellectual Property Rights Chapter (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text].  The second leak, of the United States’ 
proposals on pharmaceutical-related issues, occurred in October 2011.  Trans-
Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Oct. 2011 Leaked 
Text].  The third, by Wikileaks in November 2013, contained the consolidated 
intellectual property text, including the negotiating positions of all parties.  Trans-
Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter (Aug. 2013) available at 
http://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text] (reflecting the text as of August 2013, a 
date which coincided with the last full negotiating round which took place in 
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei).  
14  See Krista L. Cox, Hot Topics in the Intellectual Property Chapter of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP): How Will Things Shake Out?, KNOWLEDGE 
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These higher standards of protection proposed by the United 
States include, inter alia, longer terms of protection for copyright, 
aggressive measures on “digital locks” or technological protection 
measures, patent term extensions, controversial measures to link 
patent status to drug registration, and high measures of damages.15 
Overall, these proposals would result in higher costs for 
copyrighted and patented goods.  In some areas of the intellectual 
property text, it appears that the United States proposals 
specifically target the domestic laws or intellectual property 
practices of India16 or China,17 in an attempt to create new global 
norms that would isolate these countries. 
For many of the parties to the negotiations, particularly 
developing nations, the United States’ proposals, if accepted, 
would require changes to their domestic laws, impacting access to 
knowledge and access to medicines.  These proposed provisions 
often go well beyond international treaties and are not part of the 
                                                     
ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://keionline.org/node/1794 
(describing controversial and potential problems in the TPP Agreement).  
15  Id.  See also Cox, supra note 5 (describing the United States’ proposed 
measures in the agreement).  
16  Compare, e.g., The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, A.I.R. Manual (1979), vol. 27 
(India), § 3(d) (stating that a new invention does not include “the mere discovery 
of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of 
the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or 
new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or 
apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least 
one new reactant”) with U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 8.1 (“In 
addition, the Parties confirm that: patents shall be available for any new forms, 
uses, or methods of using a known product; and a new form, use, or method of 
using a known product may satisfy the criteria for patentability, even if such 
invention does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that 
product.”).  Similarly, Article 25 of the Indian Patent Act explicitly permits 
systems of pre-grant opposition “[w]here an application for a patent has been 
published but a patent has not been granted, any person may, in writing, 
represent by way of opposition to the Controller against the grant of patent,” 
Patent Act § 25 (1970), while Article 8.7 of the U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text would 
prohibit pre-grant opposition “[w]here a Party provides proceedings that permit a 
third party to oppose the grant of a patent, a Party shall not make such 
proceedings available before the grant of the patent.”  Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, supra note 13, at art. 8.7. 
17  Mike Palmedo, President Obama: Intellectual Property Provisions in the TPP 
“Will Help Us in Our Negotiations with China”, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 14, 2013), 
http://infojustice.org/archives/30965. 
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current legal regimes of many of the TPP parties.18  Why, then, 
would developing countries like Malaysia and Vietnam, or 
wealthier nations with smaller markets like New Zealand and 
Brunei, agree to these higher standards that are likely to increases 
costs for education and make it more difficult to protect the public 
health? 
In an agreement like the TPP, the intellectual property chapter 
does not exist in a vacuum and consideration must be given to the 
over twenty other chapters.  Pressure to accept these proposals on 
intellectual property can arise in exchange for the United States, 
the country with the largest economic market, making concessions 
in other areas, such as better market access for dairy, sugar, rice or 
textiles—goods that other countries export.  Intellectual property 
simply is not a priority for many of the TPP negotiating parties, 
particularly in comparison to market access for their key exports. 
4. BALANCING THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  PRESERVING FLEXIBILITIES 
All countries, but particularly developing countries, should 
carefully consider the effect that higher intellectual property rights 
protection will have on important public interest values such as 
education and the public health.  Although all negotiating parties 
are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
and therefore bound by minimum international standards, TRIPS 
provides for numerous flexibilities that permit members to 
implement the agreement in various ways that take into account 
the public interest. 
One primary flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement lies in the fact 
that many terms used are left undefined, thereby allowing 
                                                     
18  Many of the aforementioned proposals have already been accepted by 
those countries with existing free trade agreements with the United States.  See 
generally, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Australia, ch. 17, Jan. 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/as
set_upload_file469_5141.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, ch. 17, Jan. 1,  
2004, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_
upload_file912_4011.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Peru, ch. 16, Feb. 1, 2009, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1031; Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.-Singapore, Jan. 1, 2004, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/a
sset_upload_file708_4036.pdf.  See also Public Citizen, TPP Countries Resource Page, 
http://www.citizen.org/TPP-country-resource-page (providing comparisons of 
current regimes with prior leaked text).   
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countries to determine for themselves, according to their national 
context, how to interpret standards such as, for example, the terms 
used for establishing patentability criteria of “new,” “inventive 
step,” and “capable of industrial application.”19  For example, such 
flexibility permits countries to set higher standards for 
patentability, among other areas.  The initial proposal by the 
United States in February 2011 revealed efforts to restrict this 
flexibility by expressly defining such terms in a manner that would 
effectively lower patentability criteria.20 
Another critical flexibility expressly exists in Article 6 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which notes that, “nothing in this Agreement 
shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights.”21  This article permits each member to determine 
whether to implement systems of national, regional, or 
international exhaustion of goods.  Lower-income countries or 
those with smaller markets often prefer international exhaustion, 
in order to ensure that the country can import goods protected by 
intellectual property.22  Parallel importation can allow countries to 
access goods like books, movies, and medicines, often at more 
affordable prices.  Sometimes, goods are not even available in 
certain markets.  These markets are ignored by right holders who 
choose not to invest, either because of the low-income status of the 
country or, in the case of certain high-income countries, because of 
the smaller size of their markets.23  The proposed text tabled by the 
United States in February 2011 included a provision that would 
                                                     
19  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27.1, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
20  U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 8.  
21  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 6. 
22  See Alberto Cerda, USTR New Exclusive Right for Copyright Holders: 
Importation Provision in the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L (July 5, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://keionline.org/node/1176 (“[S]ome 
TPPA negotiating parties have adopted international exhaustion of rights into 
their domestic laws, which means right holders do not control international free 
flow of their works . . . .  Sacrificing consumers’ interest is highly problematic for 
those countries, because they cannot enjoy any advantage of scale economies”); 
Brief for Knowledge Ecology Int’l as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013) (No. 11-697), 2012 WL 
2867812, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109718 (discussing the 
application of exhaustion in U.S. law).  
23  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/3
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ban parallel importation of most copyrighted works.24  Subsequent 
to that proposal, the Supreme Court decided in Kirtsaeng v. John 
Wiley & Sons by a 6–3 margin that the United States implements a 
system of international exhaustion and the first sale of a 
copyrighted good anywhere in the world exhausts the rights of the 
rightholder, thereby permitting parallel importation.25  This ruling, 
which settled a circuit split amongst the federal appellate courts, 
directly conflicted with the United States’ proposal in the TPP.  
Even several months after the Court’s ruling in March 2013, the 
United States’ proposal regarding parallel importation remained 
unchanged, as reflected in the August 2013 text leaked by 
Wikileaks.26 
The TRIPS Agreement also permits certain exclusions from 
patentability under Articles 27.2 and 27.3 including to “protect 
ordre public or morality,” as well as specific exclusions for 
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, and plants and 
animals.27  Again, the February 2011 text by the United States 
sought to limit these flexibilities.  For example, the initial proposal 
for the intellectual property chapter added the word “only” to the 
exclusion of that which is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality, limiting this provision further than Article 27.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.28  The United States’ initial proposal also would 
reverse the explicit exception contained in Article 27.3 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, instead requiring the patenting of medical methods and 
plants and animals.29  The August 2013 text reflected some changes 
to the initial United States’ proposal, and Article 27.2 of TRIPS is 
replicated in the agreed-to text of the TPP without the word 
“only.”30  Furthermore, the United States modified its language 
regarding patenting of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
                                                     
24  U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 4.2. 
25  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013). 
26  U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. QQ.G.3.  
27  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, at arts. 27.2, 27.3. 
28  U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 8.3. 
29  Id. at art. 8.2. 
30  Compare U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 8.3 (“Each Party 
may only exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within its territory 
of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality” (emphasis added)) with U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at 
art. QQ.E.1.2 (“Each Party may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention 
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre 
public or morality”). 
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methods, though its proposal has not garnered the support of a 
single other TPP negotiating party.31 
Another key flexibility contained in the TRIPS Agreement 
exists in Article 31 governing compulsory licenses or “[o]ther [u]se 
[w]ithout [a]uthorization of the [r]ight [h]older.”32  The TRIPS 
Agreement explicitly permits governments to allow the production 
of patented products even absent the consent of the rightholder.  
Each member to the TRIPS Agreement has the sovereign right to 
issue a compulsory license and determine the circumstances under 
which such a license may be granted.  In 2001, WTO members 
concluded the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
(“Doha Declaration”), a statement that largely confirmed the rights 
of members to protect the public health and definitively affirmed 
some existing flexibilities.33  Although some rightholders and 
governments have tried to limit the Doha Declaration to a set of 
specific diseases or cases of national emergency, including, 
arguably, through the United States’ initial text on the Doha 
Declaration contained in its TPP proposal,34 the WTO has 
                                                     
31 See U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. QQ.E.1.3(b). 
32 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 31. 
33 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of Nov. 14, 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].  See 
also World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Health: Frequently Asked Questions: 
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last 
visited March 1, 2014)  (“For the main part the declaration was important for 
clarifying the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities and assuring governments that they 
can use the flexibilities, because some governments were unsure about how the 
flexibilities would be interpreted.”). 
34 Compare World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Health, supra note 33 with 
U.S. Oct. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. x (declining to reference the Doha 
Declaration, the United States’ proposal on pharmaceuticals tabled in September 
2011 incorporates portions of the language of the Declaration while omitting other 
sections.  This selectivity of the language contained in Doha could be read as an 
attempt by the United States to limit its application to “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or 
national emergency.”  As a result, efforts to address non-communicable diseases 
or other non-epidemics, non-urgent situations could be threatened by the 
language proposed by the United States for the TPP).  See also Brook K. Baker, US 
Doha Flexibilities in its Proposed TPP IP Text Are Not Nearly Good Enough, 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 23, 2011), http://infojustice.org/resource-library/us-doha-
flexibilities-in-its-proposed-tpp-ip-text-are-not-nearly-good-enough (“[C]lose 
analysis [of the Oct. 2011 leaked text] proves that the words chosen do not 
provide sufficient guarantees to assure that TPPA partners will be able to make 
maximum use of TRIPS and Doha compliant flexibilities to maximize access to 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/3
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confirmed that a government does not need to limit issuance of a 
compulsory license to emergencies:  “This is a common 
misunderstanding.  The TRIPS Agreement does not specifically list 
the reasons that might be used to justify compulsory licensing.  
However, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
confirms that countries are free to determine the grounds for 
granting compulsory licences.”35 
The TRIPS Agreement also permits governments to address 
anti-competitive behavior and abuses of intellectual property 
rights.36  Both the United States and Japan have opposed a 
provision supported by the other ten TPP negotiating parties that 
would permit parties to address “(a) the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices that 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology; and (b) anticompetitive practices that may 
result from the abuse of intellectual property rights . . .”37 signaling 
the intention to limit this flexibility. 
While the above list of flexibilities is not exhaustive, it reflects 
some key areas where the United States has sought to change 
global norms and limit existing flexibilities under international 
law.  These flexibilities provide important mechanisms for 
countries to address abuses by rightholders and create intellectual 
property systems that take the public interest into account.  In 
order to protect serious public interest concerns including, inter 
alia, education and public health, negotiating partners in the TPP 
should preserve these TRIPS flexibilities. 
One tactic a country might take to protect the public with 
respect to intellectual property would be simply to point to 
existing international standards and try to limit obligations to these 
minimum standards, such as those found in the TRIPS Agreement.  
Even with agreements that go beyond TRIPS and create new 
rights, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, these international agreements tend to be less 
aggressive than the United States’ proposals in the TPP and permit 
greater flexibility in implementation.38  For example, the United 
                                                     
more affordable medicines for all.”).  
35  World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Health, supra note 33.  
36  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 40. 
37  U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. QQ.A.9.  
38  Compare WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), art. 11, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
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States’ copyright-related proposals on technological protection 
measures and Internet service provider (ISP) liability are based on 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), legislation in 
which the proponents admitted the provisions went far beyond 
international obligations.39  Harm may therefore be mitigated by 
accepting the TRIPS-plus measures that exist in other international 
agreements and agreeing to ratify these treaties, but rejecting the 
specific provisions of the proposed TPP text that limit flexibilities 
or direct countries to implement treaties in a particular manner. 
Furthermore, although the intellectual property chapter may 
not be considered the most important chapter for many of the 
parties to the TPP, in large trade agreements with wide ranging 
levels of development, one might argue that greater leverage exists 
than in a bilateral trade agreement.  In a large scale agreement 
between numerous parties, like the TPP, developing countries may 
choose to form voting blocs and support each other on key issues, 
either by attributing support to proposals made by other 
developing countries or by opposing aggressive provisions by the 
United States.  A group of five countries across the development 
spectrum—Canada, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand and 
Singapore—in fact came together to draft and table a 
counterproposal to the United States with respect to 
pharmaceuticals.40  After the proposal was tabled, Vietnam joined 
                                                     
I.L.M. 65 (entered into force Mar. 2, 2002) (“Contracting Parties shall provide 
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention 
of effective technological measures”) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT), art. 18, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (entered into force May 
20, 2002) (“Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological 
measures that are used by performers or producers of phonograms”) with U.S. 
Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 4.9 (outlining specific remedies and 
consequences for circumventing the partnership agreement). 
39  See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the 
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 537 
(1999) (“Although Administration officials admitted in Congressional testimony 
that its preferred legislation went beyond what the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
required, it argued for this broader rule in part to set a standard that would help 
the U.S. persuade other countries to pass similarly strong rules.”). 
40  Krista Cox, TPP Negotiating Parties’ Counterproposal to the US on Medicines 
Represents a More Flexible Approach, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:39 
AM), http://keionline.org/node/1826.  Reportedly, Australia was one of six 
countries that took part in initially drafting this proposal, but Australia dropped 
from the group when the text was tabled during the August 2013 round in Brunei 
due to the period of elections taking place domestically.  Id.  
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support in many portions of the counterproposal, which largely 
reflected the standards of the TRIPS Agreement, including 
explicitly preserving many TRIPS flexibilities.41 
Alternatively, however, an argument can be made that because 
the United States represents a disproportionate percentage of the 
economy in the TPP—particularly before latecomer parties, 
Canada, Mexico and Japan42—it “has more political and economic 
leverage over the other parties in the TPP” and “is able to rely 
more on its sheer economic and geopolitical strengths to push for 
provisions that are in the interest of its intellectual property 
industries.”43  Furthermore, as discussed supra, the United States 
may offer concessions in other chapters in exchange for receiving 
support for its intellectual property provisions.44  Thus, the voting 
blocs may quickly disintegrate once the United States makes 
concessions in particular areas of concerns to countries that have 
opposed the United States’ proposals. 
Countries might also try to use current international will and 
trends in an attempt to resist the United States’ TRIPS-plus 
proposals.  In June 2013, for example, a WIPO diplomatic 
conference successfully concluded the Marrakesh Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled45 and fifty-one 
                                                     
41  Id. 
42  Canada and Mexico joined the negotiations on December 2012 during the 
round that took place in Auckland, New Zealand.  Japan entered the negotiations 
on the last day of the round that took place in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia in July 
2013.  The first official round of the TPP negotiations took place in 2010. 
43  Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property 
Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 16, 25–26 (2012).  Yu notes that the TPP 
negotiations may be more dangerous than the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, an intellectual property enforcement agreement negotiated between 
primarily high-income, developed countries.  Yu notes, “[a]lthough the ACTA 
negotiations brought together two major intellectual property powers—the 
European Union and the United States—the continuous disagreements between 
these two powers resulted in the adoption of a more moderate agreement.”  Id. at 
25.  
44  Id. at 27 (“Because of the different value negotiating parties place on trade 
and trade-related items, some parties may be willing to concede more on 
intellectual property protection and enforcement in exchange for greater benefits 
in other trade or trade-related areas.”). 
45  Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons 
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, adopted June 27, 
2013, WIPO Doc. VIP/DC/8 Rev. [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty].  Although the 
treaty is not yet in force, among the TPP negotiating parties, Chile, Peru and the 
United States have all signed the agreement.  WIPO Administered Treaties, 
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countries immediately signed, a record number of signatures 
during a WIPO treaty signing ceremony.46  Significantly, this treaty 
represented the first conclusion of a WIPO human rights treaty or 
agreement designed to primarily serve the interests of the users of 
intellectual property goods rather than the rightholder.  The 
Marrakesh Treaty created minimum standards for limitations and 
exceptions to copyright rather than minimum standards for 
protection of copyright.  Currently, WIPO also appears to be 
considering other treaties in the interest of users of intellectual 
property, such as one for libraries and one on education.47  TPP 
parties may try to leverage the international will in promoting the 
positive agenda and ensuring robust limitations and exceptions to 
intellectual property rights in the context of the trade agreement. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The choice to institute higher levels of intellectual property 
protection, particularly without proper balancing mechanisms to 
protect the users, can detrimentally affect the public interest.  Even 
with the promise of foreign direct investment or greater market 
access to economies such as the United States, caution must be 
taken to ensure that certain TRIPS flexibilities are preserved so that 
these countries can further develop.  Furthermore, and as 
discussed above, foreign direct investment is often more 
dependent on factors other than the levels of intellectual property 
protection and economies such as India or China are seeing 
increased levels of investment, despite lower levels of protection. 
One might also consider what the important trends are in 
intellectual property investment.  While certainly the traditional 
content industries remain viable investment choices, recent years 
                                                     
Marrakesh VIP Treaty, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/wipo_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=843&gro
up_id=1 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).  
46  Thiru Balasubramaniam, 28 June 2013: 51 Signatories to the Marrakesh 
Treaty, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L  (July 2, 2013, 4:17 AM), 
http://keionline.org/node/1769. 
47  See WIPO, Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, 26th 
Sess., Dec. 16–20, 2013, Draft Agenda, Agenda Item 7–8, SCCR/26/1 Prov. (May 
13, 2013) (indicating that “[l]imitations and exceptions for libraries and archives” 
and “[l]imitations and exceptions for educational and research institutions and for 
persons with other disabilities” are agenda items).  
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have seen the growth of “fair use” industries.48  These industries 
depend on or benefit from limitations and exceptions, most notably 
“fair use,” as a critical component to their business models rather 
than relying on the creation of higher levels of intellectual property 
protection.  Such industries may include manufacturers of certain 
consumer devices, programmers, software developers, educational 
institutions, Internet search and web-hosting providers, among 
others.  A 2011 study of fair use industries in the United States 
highlighted that these industries represent one-sixth of total GDP, 
amounting to $17.7 million.49  In 2008 and 2009, fair use industries 
reportedly “generated total revenue averaging $4.6 trillion, a 35 
percent increase over 2002 revenue of $3.4 trillion.”50  Exports for 
fair use industries increased sixty-four percent from 2002 to 2008.51  
Singapore, after amending its copyright law to expand fair use, 
saw an increase in annual growth for its private copying 
industries.52  As these fair industries grow and contribute to an 
increasing percentage of a country’s GDP, it may be time to rethink 
whether continually ratcheting up intellectual property protections 
will ultimately cause more harm than good, not only in terms of 
the public interest in accessing patented and copyrighted goods, 
but also with respect to contributions to the economy as new 
technologies and industries arise. 
 
                                                     
48  See generally THOMAS ROGERS ET. AL., ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF 
INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (2011).  
49  Id. at 21.  
50  Id.  
51  Id. at 26. 
52  ROYA GHAFELE & BENJAMIN GILBERT, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF FAIR USE IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW: COUNTERFACTUAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF FAIR USE POLICY ON 
PRIVATE COPYING TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT MARKETS IN SINGAPORE 5 (2012), 
(“Prior to the amendment of fair use policies, private copying technology 
industries experienced—1.97% average annual growth.  After the changes were 
introduced, the same industries enjoyed a 10.18% average annual growth rate.”). 
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